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This note discusses some mathematical misunderstandings about Savage (1954). It is shown that in his model 
the probability measure cannot be countably additive, that the set of events must be a u-algebra and not just 
an algebra, that Savage did not characterize all atomless finitely additive probability measures, and that the 
state space in his model, while infinite, does not have to be uncountable. 
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In this note we discuss some mathematical misunderstandings about Savage (1954). 
We also clarify some misunderstandings that might arise in relation to the recent 
Lehrer (1991). That paper gives the most general result on qualitative probability 
theory, presently available in the literature, by extending earlier results of Chateauneuf 
(1985). The results of Section 6 there, however, should not be related to Savage’s 
set-up, as examples will demonstrate. Those results hold true, and were meant’ 
only for countably additive probability measures with o-algebras as domain. This 
note shows that they do not apply to general finitely additive probability measures, 
as in Savage’s set-up. The observations of this note will not be surprising to the 
reader acquainted with the intricacies of finite additivity as opposed to countable 
additivity. Nevertheless, given the importance of Savage’s work, and the frequency 
of the misunderstandings, the work seems worthwhile. Usually students are taught 
the properties of countably additive measures, not of finitely additive measures. As 
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a consequence, often scientists erroneously apply results, only valid for countably 
additive measures, to finitely additive measures. An extensive work dealing with 
finite additivity is Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983). 
Savage (1954) assumes that &, the collection of events under consideration, con- 
tains all subsets of S, where S denotes the state space. Working with the collection 
of all subsets is not customary in probability theory. One problem is that it is an 
open question whether there exists an atomless countably additive probability measure 
on a collection of all subsets of a set. In particular this means that it is not known 
if it is at all possible to have the probability measure countably additive in Savage’s 
set-up! That possibility depends on the axioms from set-theory that one accepts: 
Observation 1. In Savage’s (1954) model, where all subsets of S are events, the 
probability measure cannot be countably additive if the continuum hypothesis is 
added to the set-theoretic axioms. 0 
The continuum hypothesis entails that there is no cardinality between that of the 
natural numbers and the reals. See Jech (1978, Corollary 1 of Lemma 27.9). If one 
does not accept the continuum hypothesis and assumes existence of a countably ad- 
ditive probability measure in Savage’s set-up, then there is no constructive way to 
obtain that probability measure. That is, if they exist, we will never meet them. 
Savage avoided the assumption that d is a general cr-algebra only for simpliticy of 
presentation, to make his work accessible to readers not acquainted with measure- 
theory. This is suggested in Savage (1954, p. 40, 1.25/26 ‘except for expository 
complications...‘). All of Savage’s results and derivations remain valid if &’ is 
assumed to be a general a-algebra; see Savage (1954, p. 40, 1.24125 ‘there is no 
technical obstacle to.. .‘). A ccording to Savage (1954, p. 43, first paragraph) it is 
crucial though that ,_PZ be a a-algebra, not just an algebra. In spite of this explicit 
statement, many misunderstandings have arisen in relation to this point. Wakker 
(1981) pointed out several of these. 
Observation 2. Savage’s analysis remains valid if &’ is taken to be a o-algebra. This 
is not the case if &’ is an algebra. 0 
Section 6 in Lehrer (1991) may lead to the misunderstanding that Savage would 
have characterized all relations on any algebra which can be represented by an 
atomless probability measure. This is not the case, as will be demonstrated below. 
Lehrer intended his results only for countably additive probability measures; Savage 
(1954) deals with finitely additive probability measures. Throughout what follows, 
A denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, I]. An atom is an event with positive meas- 
ure, such that any subevent has either that same measure, or measure 0. 
Example 1. Let S= (0, 11. Let P'= A/3 + 2 w/3, where w is the atomic measure 
assigning measure 1 to { l/2}. P' is defined on the Bore1 subsets, where {l/2} is an 
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atom. For .&, however, we take the algebra of all finite unions of left-open right- 
closed intervals. P is the restriction of P’ to ~4. P is atomless. It does not satisfy 
the axioms of Savage, in particular fineness does not hold. Note that Q = J_/4 + 3 w/4 
represents the same ordering on d as P. 0 
The representation P in the above example was not uniquely determined. So 
Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 in Lehrer (1991) cannot be extended to finitely additive 
probability measures on algebras. In the following example J will contain all sub- 
sets. It will thus be as in Savage (1954), and obviously is a a-algebra. 
Example 2. Let S = (0, 11, and .xZ be the collection of all subsets of S. With slight 
abuse of notation, we denote by A an extension, finitely additive, of the Lebesgue 
measure to .&. 1 is atomless since S can be split up in arbitrarily fine ‘uniform’ parti- 
tions, i.e. partitions containing equally-probable events. Let w be a finitely additive 
measure on all subsets of (0, 11, still to be defined. It will only assign measures 0 or 
1. We take w to be absolutely continuous with respect to I, i.e. any I-null set has 
w-measure 0. Furthermore, we set w((O,e])= 1 and w((E, 11) =0 for all &>O. Ob- 
viously this already suffices to assure that w is not countably additive, even if its 
domain would only contain Bore1 sets. This w can be extended to all subsets of S, 
in many ways, by means of the Hahn-Banach extension theorem, or the choice ax- 
iom, such that only measures 0 and 1 are assigned. (The sets with w-measure 1 con- 
stitute an ‘ultrafilter’ containing, among others, all sets with A-measure 1.) Finally 
P : = l/3 + 2 w/3. This P is atomless, since any set with positive P-measure must have 
positive A-measure, and so must have a subset with strictly smaller, but positive, P- 
measure. Savage’s axioms are not satisfied, in particular fineness is violated. Q:= 
A/4 + 3 w/4 represents the same ordering on d as P. 0 
The above example shows that, also if the algebra of events contains all subsets, 
then Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 of Lehrer (1991, Section 4) still hold true only for 
countably additive probability measures. Furthermore, it shows that ‘convex- 
rangedness’ of the probability measure (for each event A, and 01~ I P(A), there 
exists an event BcA with P(B)=p), while equivalent to atomlessness for countably 
additive probability measures, for finitely additive probability measures is more 
restrictive than atomlessness. 
Observation 3. Savage did not characterize all atomless finitely additive probability 
measures. 0 
Savage (1954) did not give conditions that on general a-algebras would imply 
countable additivity of the probability measure. For qualitative probability theory 
such a condition was given in Villegas (1964). He characterized all atomless count- 
ably additive probability measures on a-algebras. Arrow (1965) used this to give an 
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elegant presentation of Savage’s (1954) result on general a-algebras which does in- 
corporate countable additivity. 
Let us take the opportunity to discuss one more misunderstanding. The following 
example proves Observation 4. 
Example 3. Let S = (0, l] fl Q, &’ contains all subsets of S. Let P assign the length 
of any interval to its intersection with S. P can be extended to &‘. P satisfies all of 
Savage’s conditions, and obviously is not countably additive. Even while for each 
BcS and OspuP(B) there is CE.& with P(C)=p, S is countable. If [O,l] is the 
set of consequences and utility is identity, then expected utility maximization satis- 
fies all of Savage’s postulates for preferences. q 
Observation 4. Savage’s axioms do not imply that the state space be uncount- 
able. 0 
Finally we mention that in Wakker (1991) it is shown that Savage’s axioms usually 
necessitate a violation of stochastic dominance in the traditional sense, and that 
therefore for finitely additive probability measures an alternative definition of 
stochastic dominance is warranted. 
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